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ARTICLE
JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN FAMILY COURT: A
CAUTIONARY TALE
By: Jane M. Spinak*
Charles Miller Endowed Lecture
University of Tennessee College of Law
For the past 35 years I have been practicing in,
teaching, and writing about the Family Court. The problemsolving court movement in the last two decades – with its
proliferation of drug courts, mental health courts, and
veterans courts, to name a few – renewed my interest in the
historical roots of the family court because of the parallels
between the original juvenile court and the recent problem
solving court movement. One of the key elements—
perhaps the defining element—in both is the role of the
judge as the leader of the court. That is what I want to
focus on today. I’ve called this talk a cautionary tale; what
I mean is that the idea of judicial leadership as it developed
in the juvenile and family court historically, and as it is still
being applied in those courts and in the newer problem
solving courts today, is based on an idealized conception of
the judge that has never been true and is unlikely ever to be
true. Consequently, building a court around this idealized
notion of the judicial leader is a dangerous proposition.

*

Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School. I would like to thank the faculty, staff , and students of the
University of Tennesse College of Law for their warm welcome last
April to Knoxville, especially Professors Wendy Bach and Valerie
Vojdik for inviting me, Professor Penny White for asking to publish
this lecture, and Dean Doug Blaze for facilitating such interesting
conversations during my visit.
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We’ll begin with the words of a contemporary
family court leader. Judge Leonard Edwards received the
2004 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence,
bestowed each year by the National Center for State Courts
to a state court judge who “exemplifies the highest level of
judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional
ethics.”150 Judge Edwards, a distinguished and dedicated
family court judge from California, is the first and only
juvenile or family court judge to receive the award, a
testament to his national leadership on behalf of these
courts. Here are his words:
Judges in the juvenile court
are charged with keeping
children
safe;
restoring
families; finding permanency
for children; and holding
youth, families, and service
providers accountable . . . We
have to convene child- and
family-serving
agencies,
schools, and the community
around the problems facing
our most vulnerable and
troubled children . . . The role
of the juvenile court judge is
unlike any other. In the
traditional
judicial
role,
deciding a legal issue may
complete the judge’s task;
however, in deciding the
future of a child or family
150

Leonard P. Edwards, Remarks of Judge Edward P. Leonards at the
Presentation of the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence (Nov. 18, 2004), in 5 J. CENTER FAM. CHILDREN & CTS.
169, 169 (2004).

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 49
member, the juvenile court
judge must, in addition to
making a legal decision, be
prepared to take on the role
of an administrator, a
collaborator, a convener, and
an advocate.151
Judge Edwards is proud that the family court judge is not
limited to the traditional judicial role of legal decisionmaker, but instead given broad responsibility for children
and families, which requires each judge to be an
administrator, collaborator, convener and advocate. Judge
Edwards’ award was presented in the Great Hall of the
United States Supreme Court and Judge Edwards took the
opportunity to remind his august audience of the critical
work done by his colleagues throughout the country while
also lamenting how infrequently the Court has
acknowledged that work. Judge Edwards carefully
sidesteps the severe chastisement that the Court had
delivered in several of its most famous juvenile cases, such
as In re Gault and Mckeiver v. Pennsylvania, where the
Court criticized the work of many of his colleagues as it
struggled to define the proper role of the juvenile court
judge, expressing uncertainty whether the multiplicity of
roles that Judge Edwards heralds can be filled by the mere
mortals who become family court judges.
These multiple roles are a departure from the
impartial, restrained and objective judge in the common
law tradition and shift judicial responsibility from
individualized legal determinations to a broader conception
of judicial leadership. As the ultimate authority in the
courtroom, judges in all trial courts today assume a
leadership role to make sure the case moves along
151

Id. at 170.
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expeditiously, that due process protections are upheld, and
that everyone in the courtroom is doing his or her job.
Professor Judith Resnik calls this modern decision-maker
the “managerial judge.”152
The family court judge,
however, is given a different managerial role. As defined
in the New York Family Court Act, the family court judge
is given “a wide range of powers for dealing with the
complexities of family life so that its action may fit the
particular needs of those before it.”153
As the myriad proceedings concerning families
have become increasingly consolidated into a single court
system – a unified family court in many states – the role of
the judge as the leader inside and outside the courtroom has
intensified. The trajectory toward unification and greater
judicial authority over all aspects of family conflict within
a single judicial decision-maker raises significant questions
about the ability of the judge to balance his or her ability to
make impartial and fair determinations while using the
extensive discretion granted to the court to “fit the
particular needs of those before it.”154 The family court
unification movement, which began in earnest in the
middle of the twentieth century and continues today, is the
most important development since the juvenile court’s
creation. The movement, however, has resisted the
historical lessons of judicial leadership in its predecessor
courts, which provide a cautionary tale against
consolidating too much power in one judge. Even in
Tennessee, where a unified system has not been adopted,
juvenile court jurisdiction extends to dependency, status
offenses, delinquency, custody, termination of parental
rights, paternity, support and other related issues. Without
unification, judges with juvenile court jurisdiction here
have tremendous authority over the intersecting issues that
152

Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 141 (McKinney 2008).
154
Id.
153
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bring families before them. Later, I will distinguish
between the administrative advantages of unification and
the disadvantages of situating too much power within a
single decision-maker. First, let us look at the similarities
between Judge Edwards’ description of his role and the
words used by of some of the founders of the juvenile court
to understand better the historical underpinnings of the
judge’s role.
In his remarks Judge Edwards said: “We are the
legal equivalent of an emergency room in the medical
profession. We intervene in crises and figure out the best
response on a case-by-case, individualized basis.”155 At the
beginning of the 20th century, juvenile court judges were
similarly described as “doctor-counselors” or “judicial
therapists” who “[are] specialists in the art of human
relations.”156 The judge’s task was to “get the whole truth
about a child” like “a physician searches for every detail
that bears on the condition of a patient.”157 The medical
metaphor is in stark contrast to a judge who is being asked
to determine whether a child committed a crime or a parent
is neglectful. Those determinations rely on evidence of
acts and intent rather than what the best response to those
acts might be. Judge Harvey Humphrey Baker, the first
judge of the Boston juvenile court, uses medical metaphors
to explain why the juvenile court doesn’t “confine its
attention to just the particular offense which brought the
child to its notice.”158 Judge Baker believed “it is helpful to
think of [court officials] as physicians in a dispensary,”159
referring to both the physical arrangement of a juvenile
155

Edwards, supra note 150 at 170.
Anthony M. Platt, THE CHILD SAVERS 142 (1969).
157
Id. at 142-43.
158
Harvey H. Baker, The Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court, in
HARVEY HUMPHREY BAKER, UPBUILDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT 114
(1910).
159
Id. at 109.
156
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court but also to the way in which the court conducts its
business:
In
determining
the
disposition to be made of the
case the procedure of the
physician is very closely
followed . . . The judge and
probation officer consider
together, like a physician and
his junior, whether the
outbreak which resulted in
the arrest of the child was
largely accidental, or whether
it is habitual or likely to be
so; whether it is due chiefly
to some inherent physical or
moral defect of the child, or
whether some feature of his
environment is an important
factor; and then they address
themselves to the question of
how permanently to prevent
the recurrence.160
Even Judge Baker knew the limitations of the analogy,
recognizing that a child did not come voluntarily to the
court as a patient comes to a dispensary. And while a
doctor may have a duty to minimize pain, the judge and
probation officer “from time to time deliberately cause the
child discomfort, because the discomfort of punishment
affords in some cases an indispensible stimulus or moral
tonic which cannot be supplied in any other way.”161

160
161

Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 53
This medical metaphor does not fit well into the
common law tradition where the judge’s “sole duty is to
determine under the law and the facts the questions
presented.”162 Some judges at the time suggested that the
juvenile court seemed better suited to the investigative
tradition of civil law countries.163 Judge Willis B. Perkins,
a prosecutor and later a Michigan Circuit judge early in the
20th Century, urged adoption of the inquisitorial tradition of
the civil law courts of continental Europe to allow the judge
to scrutinize deeply into the family’s life. Judge Perkins
said:
The judge of a family court
must have larger powers than
these. He must be at liberty to
investigate or cause to be
investigated every anti-social
or abnormal act growing out
of family disturbances. His
duties must necessarily be
inquisitorial
rather
than
accusatory . . . To empower a
judge to act on his own
initiative immediately and
without
pleadings;
to
authorize him to become the
general
supervisor
and
mentor of the home and its
several occupants, will be a
new
thing
in
our
jurisprudence.164

162

Willis B. Perkins, Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REV. 378, 380
(1919).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 381.
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Judge Perkins was nevertheless concerned that society
would not tolerate these “tyrannical methods unless they
are fruitful of good results,” so he set the standard for this
new kind of judicial officer very high:
It is apparent, therefore, that
a judge who is given these
extraordinary powers must be
a man well versed in the law,
of
large
experience,
unswerving firmness, broad
sympathies, and clear, quick
and accurate judgments.
Wanting in any of these
elements, his work must
fail.165
The tension between setting extraordinary high
standards for judges implementing this foreign, even
tyrannical, process and worrying that they will fail to meet
those standards pervades the history of the court.
Julian W. Mack, a founder of the juvenile court and
one of its most famous jurists, put it this way:
I know – and the other judges
have told me the same thing –
that the good people of the
community think that every
judge of the juvenile court
must necessarily be a fine
fellow, filled with the
wisdom of the ages, capable
of dealing with all the

165

Id.
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children that come before
him.166
Like Judge Edwards nearly a century later, Judge Mack
conceived:
[T]he duty of the juvenile
court judge [is] to go out into
his community, if not into the
larger community of the
country at
large,
and
stimulate and arouse the
people to a sense of their
obligation to the wards who
come into his immediate
care, as it is to sit daily on his
bench and deal with those
individual children.167
Both Judge Mack and Judge Edwards fulfilled those duties,
lecturing widely, writing about their experiences, sitting on
local and national commissions and serving as models of
great jurists. With hindsight, Judge Mack admits that this
fine fellow is less perfect than the community thought:
That sort of a genius does not
exist. He may in the course of
time,
through
unusual
experience and opportunity,
gain considerable wisdom . . .
But few judges are really
temperamentally fitted, and
few are so eminently
166

Julian W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in Juvenile Court, in THE
CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 313 (1925).
167
Id. at 316.

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 56
endowed as to be able to do
the juvenile work and the
probation work and all the
other work that must be done
if the court is to be really
successful.168
Judge Mack made this observation only twenty-five
years after the juvenile court was founded and only a few
years after Judge Perkins’ comparable reflection. Yet, the
narrative of this extraordinary judicial creature is
undiminished in Judge Edwards’ remarks almost a century
later. This may be, in part, because Judge Edwards
embraces a version of the judge who is rightly more
constrained by statutory limitations and constitutional due
process protections today and therefore not quite the same
“fine fellow” the early court employed.169 Even so, the
judge’s role as a leader continues to define the court today,
even as the medicalized juvenile court evolved into a
family court more tethered to the law. This evolution
began in earnest in the middle of the 20th Century. I would
like to use the example of creating the unified family court
in New York to illustrate the enduring power of judicial
leadership 50 years after the juvenile court was founded
before turning to its enduring power today.
In 1953, Alfred Kahn published what was called a
“controversial and provocative” report, A Court for
Children, about the New York City Children’s Court.170
Dr. Kahn received the first doctorate in social welfare
issued in New York State by writing a dissertation that
would later become this report. He taught at the Columbia
School of Social Work for 57 years and became world
168

Id. at 313.
Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Juvenile Dependency Courts, 48
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1997).
170
Alfred J. Kahn, A COURT FOR CHILDREN (1953).
169
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famous for his work on children and families. Kenneth
Johnson, then Dean of the Columbia School of Social
Work, wrote in the Foreword of Kahn’s report that “[i]t
gives us facts which are not sugarcoated and which are not
pleasant to take.”171 The following year, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York issued a special report,
Children and Families in the Courts of New York City,
written by another Columbian, Professor Walter
Gellhorn.172 Gellhorn incorporated some of Dr. Kahn’s
research and insight into his own report and
recommendations. Both Dr. Kahn and Professor Gellhorn
were at the end of their careers by the time I came to
Columbia and long past thinking about family court, but I
knew them both and admired them immensely. As I’ve
worked on a book about family court, of which this talk is
part of a chapter, I feel their ghosts hovering about my
shoulders, urging me along.
By the time their reports were written, courts for
children and families had moved far beyond the original
juvenile court, addressing various issues of family
functioning including neglect and abuse, termination of
parental rights, and all aspects of domestic relations. Some
states continued to separate delinquency from other areas of
jurisdiction but many combined family issues within
specialized courts or court divisions.173 By 1949, the
national model Standard Juvenile Court Act recommended
that courts for children and families should have
jurisdiction over all family issues.174 Gellhorn’s report
agreed with that recommendation, ultimately concluding
that New York families would be better served by a unified
171

Id. at vii.
WALTER GELLHORN ET. AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURT
OF NEW YORK CITY (1954).
173
Id. at 27; Khan, supra note 170 at 22.
174
Id. at 27; NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, A
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (1949).
172
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family court.175 His recommendation was adopted by a
special City Bar Committee and led, in part, to the passage
of the 1962 New York Family Court Act, which combines
most, but not all, family proceedings in one unified Family
Court.176
Despite Gellhorn’s strong belief in unifying
jurisdiction over family matters in the new court, he
resisted recommending that the highly successful “school
part” of the Children’s Court merge into the unified court.
Gellhorn was impressed with the expertise of the four
school part judges and with the fact that children did not
seem to feel stigmatized by attending the school part. He
feared that the helping functions that seemed so successful
in the school part were not sufficiently understood nor
implemented by the bench in the rest of the Children’s
Court. Gellhorn concluded that the school part should
remain a separate entity until the community supported —
and the bench fully embraced—the helping function of the
new court that he saw exemplified by the judges of the
school part.
When Gellhorn conducted his study in the early
1950’s, his conclusion that the disjointed ways in which
child and family problems were parsed out to at least six
different courts and several divisions of those courts led
easily to a conclusion this was not a productive way to get
the work done. For Gellhorn, who is credited as one of the
creators of modern administrative law and who cared
deeply that fairness and due process were imbedded into
administrative processes, a unified Family Court was
necessary for that job. Efficiency was a by-product of his
conclusions or, as he puts it more artfully, “[t]here is more
to this suggestion than a mere aesthetic impulse to create an
orderly pattern. It rests on the solid proposition that
175

Gellhorn, supra note 172 at 390.
Id. at 12-16; Family Court Act of 1962 §115, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§115 (McKinney 2012).
176
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familial controversy can best be handled by judges who
specialize in the family.”177
A comprehensive family court would allow the
judge to provide an opportunity for the family to address
their problems in a constructive (rather than punitive) way
while using “skills drawn from the social and biological
sciences.”178 Staff would be trained in these skills and
judges would have to be willing to adopt this approach.
Judges should not be assigned to the court unless they are
“particularly understanding of the methods it must employ”
and if assignments to the court were to be rotated among
judges, they need enough stability to learn this
methodology and to develop relationships with the other
staff.179
Gellhorn’s point, throughout the study, is that the
many courts that address family issues are not set up to do
this well. He also has no doubt that many judges in the
courts he reviewed are not suited for the unified family
court he is proposing. Gellhorn does not doubt, however,
that suitable judges can be found and trained to do the
work. He remains optimistic that combining the right
organizational structure with the right personnel will
produce an effective court where “modern methods are
brought to bear on modern problems.”180 Within ten years,
the New York State Family Court had been created,
shifting most jurisdictional authority over family issues into
one unified court system. The Family Court Act also
addressed what Gellhorn had earlier proposed: “that legal
training and experience should be required before any
person may assume the office of family court judge… [and]
Judges of the family court should also be familiar with
areas of learning and practice that often are not supplied by
177

Gellhorn, supra note 172 at 382.
Id. at 384.
179
Id. at 388.
180
Id. at 390.
178
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the practice of law.”181 Like the judges of the Children’s
Court school part, judges so trained would be the judicial
leaders that Gellhorn envisioned for the new court.
Gellhorn was very careful to minimize his concerns about
the quality of the judges he was observing in his report. He
needed all the allies he could get for his ultimate unification
recommendations. His goal was to change the structure of
the system and, by doing so, he believed he would also
change the quality of the judiciary.
Modern
interdisciplinary education and better organization would
make better judges.
Dr. Kahn, the social scientist, was less convinced
that structural change was the main impediment to an
effective family court judge. He certainly agreed that
judges with specialized knowledge in a better-structured
and resourced court would do a better job. Kahn could not
avert his eyes, however, from how judges use the
jurisdictional authority that they’ve been given. His core
concern is that “in too many instances, consciously or by
implication” many Children’s Court judges “see themselves
as the Court.”182 Moreover, the litigants see the judge as
the Court: “For the majority of parents and children, the
significance of the entire court is largely decided on the
bench.” 183
Kahn wants to hold onto the idea of the juvenile
court, but he portends Justice Fortas’ concerns in Gault
about the lack of due process by more than a decade.184
Kahn believed that the judge lacks the legitimacy to enter
into the dispositional phase of a proceeding unless the
adjudicative phase incorporates the basic due process
protections of a common law court. Informality has its
181

N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §141 (McKinney 2012).
Kahn, supra note 170 at 269.
183
Id. at 98.
184
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
182
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place in making families more comfortable in the court and
in integrating the opinions of the social service or mental
health experts involved, but informality is not a substitute
for fairness at either the adjudicative or dispositional phases
of hearings; nor is the judge’s innate sense of what to do.
As Kahn bluntly writes: “Judges are prone to a major
occupational hazard – the feeling that they can readily
appraise a situation and regularly make wise decisions not
subject to question.”185 A court with few lawyers, press
oversight or regular appellate review “lends itself
particularly to such hazards.” 186 Kahn finds these hazards
throughout his study: he recounts stories of judges chiding
children for bad spelling; for not going to church or
learning the Ten Commandments; of chastising parents for
their clothes or demeanor; and for issuing orders that will
change peoples’ lives without ever looking up from the
bench. One story recounts the judge calling a young boy
into the courtroom to introduce him for the first time to his
putative father and then sending him home to live with
him! These stories don’t include the various punishments
judges regularly meted out to their young charges.187 Kahn
recognizes these occupational hazards and urges restraint
on the use of the court’s power:
It is clear that, even within a
juvenile court concerned with
arranging treatment, the
process which considers
intervention (judicial steps)
must be carefully separated
procedurally from treatment
planning (disposition) since
185

Id. at 115.
Id. That these changes have not resulted in a significantly improved
system is for other chapters.
187
Id. at 98-123.
186
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the court properly should
assert jurisdiction only in
clearly defined situations and
not simply because a judge
considers a particular child to
need treatment.188
The judge who is given the power to exercise such
instrumental authority must understand the grave
implications of that power in order to make wise findings
and proper dispositional orders. Kahn wants the judge to
be the leader of the court team that Judge Edwards
described in his 2004 speech, but most of the judges he
observes don’t define their roles in ways “consistent with
the intent of the law” or “fail to implement [the law]
successfully.”189 He reluctantly concludes, “[from] the
perspective of the aspirations of the juvenile court
movement and the expressed goals of court leadership, the
accomplishments are outweighed by the inadequacies.”190
Kahn was not alone in his assessment. A few years
after Kahn’s New York study was published, the fiftieth
anniversary of the juvenile court was commemorated by a
conference at the University of Chicago in 1959 and
resulted in a book of essays on the court called Justice for
the Child. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, a professor and
Dean at Chicago’s School of Social Services
Administration, wrote in her essay contribution that
throughout the country, the first few judges to occupy the
juvenile court bench were men of outstanding reputation
whose prestige enhanced the work of the court staff and
guaranteed community interest and support for the new
institution. Yet within two decades of its establishment,
this promising institution had become the victim of
188

Id. at 277.
Id. at 106.
190
Id. at 273.
189
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criticism and attacks that have, in substance, continued to
the present.191
Whether those original judges were as outstanding
as Professor Rosenheim reminisces a half-century on, by
the middle of the 20th century the original juvenile court
was not fulfilling its founders’ aspirations, in large part
because of its reliance on a flawed system of judicial
leadership. This leads us inevitably toward the question I
pose today. If every family court judge can’t be Julian
Mack, Len Edwards or the four judges in the school part
that Walter Gellhorn so admired, what does it mean for
judicial leadership to continue to motivate the juvenile
court, the family court and the unified family court
movement? How can this serve as the foundation of the
new problem solving court movement?
Why do I
recommend caution?
I begin to answer this question with Kahn’s
conclusion that the family court judge must have a clearly
defined basis for legal intervention in family life prior to
ever asserting authority over the dispositional phase of a
proceeding, something Kahn calls treatment planning. In
other words, I start with where we draw the jurisdictional
line before a judge can intervene in a family’s life. Let’s
use status offenses, also called unruly children in
Tennessee, as an example. These acts are called status
offenses because only minors, not adults, can be held
responsible for being incorrigible, running away, being
truant, not listening to parents or other authorities, using
drugs, or getting drunk; what Professor Rosenheim called
in the 1970’s “juvenile nuisances”.192

191

Rosenheim, JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, THE JUVENILE COURT IN
TRANSITION 10 (1962).
192
See generally, MARGARET K. ROSENHEIM, PURSUING JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (summarizing Ch. 3: Notes
on Helping Juvenile Nuisances).
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Today, the youth are called CHINS, PINS or JINS;
children, juveniles or persons in need of supervision. There
has always been significant disagreement about whether the
jurisdictional line should be drawn at actual criminal acts or
for acts that just really bother or worry us. Bringing a
youth to court for robbery or assault is very different than
bringing her to court for having sex or underage drinking.
States have drawn that line differently at different points in
their histories. Where the line is drawn affects when the
court is going to begin impacting the life of the child or
family.
States also distinguish among acts that may
constitute neglect, abuse, or a sufficient basis to terminate
parental rights. These political and cultural choices are
tempered by constitutional mandates protecting individual
liberty and family integrity. The United States Constitution
prohibits states from intervening in family life without
establishing that a family is unable to protect a child from
harm, neglect, abuse, or trouble. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that parents have fundamental rights in
raising their children, most recently declaring, “[I]t cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children."193 Unless a legally defined harm
can be established or a person voluntarily seeks the
assistance of the court, there is no authority for the judge to
intervene in the family’s life because she believes she can
make that family better.
The late Judge Robert W. Page, a New Jersey
Family Court judge who worked tirelessly for effective
family court reform, succinctly described the court’s legal
basis to intervene in a comprehensive unified family court
plan:
193

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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A court derives its very
existence and the validity of
its orders from an initial
determination of a legal basis
to act. This is true regardless
of the substantial needs of
those who are affected most
by the decision. A good rule
of thumb is the more
substantial the need for
judicial involvement, the
more the need to be
substantial in finding the
legal basis. A legal basis
includes the findings of
jurisdiction and venue at the
onset, full respect of the
rights of due process, with
reasonable notice and an
opportunity for all to be
heard and adherence to all
statutes, court rules, case
precedents and established
legal and equitable principles.
The family court is no place
for either judicial scofflaws
or goodwill ambassadors
without portfolio.194
Once a legal basis is established and supported by
sufficient evidence that a youth committed a crime or that a
parent abused a child, the judge is then empowered to
assert the broad “treatment planning” powers to administer
194

Hon. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court:
A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y
57, 84-85 (2005).
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so-called “individualized justice,” or determining what is
best for a child or a family. When Judge Baker said in
1910, “The court does not confine its attention to just the
particular offense which brought the child to its notice,” he
was lauding the court’s ability to fix whatever is wrong
with the child or his family beyond the child’s misbehavior.
195
Today, judges retain significant dispositional discretion,
even if not the same unlimited authority used by Judge
Baker.
Constitutional
protections
and
statutory
requirements limit the freewheeling authority of earlier
generations of the court. Nevertheless, within those
limitations, the judge retains tremendous authority to craft
services and dispositions. How the judge exercises that
authority often defines the court and the role it takes in
family life.
Most states have created some type of family court
as either a separate court or a division of a trial court. The
jurisdictional authority granted to these courts, however,
continues to vary considerably. Some have comprehensive
jurisdiction over a broad range of family law matters and
are able to consolidate cases about the same family under
one judge or one “team” of court personnel that includes
the judge.196 The administrative impetus for consolidating
cases is to make the court more efficient by providing a
judicial forum with broad jurisdiction that centralizes court
activities and minimizes the need for litigants to appear in
multiple proceedings in multiple fora about the same or
overlapping issues. The most obvious example is that
divorce, custody, support and maintenance issues should be
heard in the same court, preferably by the same judge, with
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all the judicial officers having access to the same
information.
A less clear-cut instance of the need for “one
family/one judge” is when a youth is being charged with
delinquency and his mother has brought a domestic
violence case against her partner.
There may be
information relevant to whether the judge paroles the
youth, such as whether the mother can supervise the youth.
On the other hand, the judge might use that information to
justify detaining the youth because he doesn’t want the
youth to witness domestic violence or live in a home with a
lesbian mother and her partner, two reasons for taking away
the youth’s liberty that may be irrelevant to the issue of
parole.
This administrative impulse for efficiency through
unification, seen half a century earlier in Professor
Gellhorn’s report, has been attributed to Roscoe Pound’s
controversial call for consolidation of trials within a unified
trial court in 1906.197 Pound, the legendary Dean of
Harvard Law School, was pursuing efficiency and
conserving resources for an inefficient court system. Late
in his life, in 1959, Pound applied those same justifications
to the family court, hoping to eliminate what he called “the
waste of time, energy and money” in addressing multiple
family issues in a multitude of judicial and administrative
settings.198 Pound leaves to others “what that court should
be or may be, or do,” while he focuses more on the court
within his broader goal of eliminating multiple tribunals as
part of modern court organization.199 Pound, nevertheless,
197
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sees this court as shouldering some of the work previously
done by other social organizations, like the church, in
deterring bad behavior and encouraging civilized society in
an increasingly heterogeneous and urban landscape.200
In leaving to others “what that court should be or
may be, or do,” Pound sidesteps the second impulse of
court unification, the therapeutic role of the court “to make
the emotional life of families and children better.”201 This
is the impulse of judicial leadership that I have cautioned
against.
In the current unification movement, the
therapeutic role of the court is manifested in two ways:
whether services to litigants are provided within or by the
court and in what way does the judge participate in creating
or monitoring the impact of any therapeutic intervention.
As part of the court’s statutory responsibilities in a
large array of cases, the judge issues orders that include
requiring family members to seek or secure assistance to
address the problems that allegedly led to court
intervention. These requirements could come at the very
beginning of a case, when the court sets conditions for a
youth’s parole after being charged with delinquency;
conditions for unsupervised visits when a child is removed
from a parent charged with neglect, or limitations on access
to the family home after allegations of domestic violence.
A youth could also be ordered to attend an afterschool
program as a condition of parole, a parent may be required
to comply with drug screening to be permitted visitation, or
a spouse may be precluded from the home without a third
party present. The court may also be statutorily mandated
to send disputing parties to mediation or other dispute
resolution mechanisms prior to adjudicating a custody case.
The scope of the court’s power to order the litigants
to comply with these types of behavioral requirements
increases dramatically once the court determines that a
200
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youth is guilty, a parent has been neglectful, or domestic
violence has occurred. Dispositional orders in these cases
could include probation, secure residential placement,
foster care, substance abuse or psychiatric treatment, or
anger management therapy. While some of these services
can only be provided by specialized agencies, many, like
substance abuse treatment or testing, parent training or
education, mediation or case conferencing, are services that
could be provided in-house by court-related or courtdirected service systems.
From the very beginning, many of the juvenile
court’s founders wanted the youth to receive whatever help
they needed at the courthouse itself. Probation officers or
social workers who were part of the court staff would
provide supervision or counseling or other assistance
directly to the young person.202 Some court reformers were
uncomfortable with courts being service providers, urging
instead a clearer line between the judge’s authority to order
a service and the provision of that service by an executive
branch agency or an independent provider.203
Recent calls for a unified family court include
centralizing services within the court again, minimizing
concern about blurring the boundaries between the court’s
power to order a disposition and the subsequent
implementation of that order.204 Instead, the proponents
focus on reducing multiple locations or service providers
for families and on developing a more holistic approach to
the families’ needs under the court’s auspices.205
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There are many concerns with the revived model of
court-based services. First, there is the traditional objection
that a court is not a social services agency and should not
act as one. The judge’s role is to make the determination
that a service is necessary by considering the evidence
presented. If the judge determines the service needs to be
ordered, it should be. What happens if the service is part of
the court itself and then there is a dispute over whether the
youth or parent has complied with the service or the service
provider has delivered the service? If the service provider
is part of the court system the court may be unable to
impartially resolve the dispute. This is not theoretical.
Professor Melissa Breger has persuasively applied
the social psychology concept of “groupthink” to family
court practice. Breger notes that “[g]roupthink may be
defined as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation
to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.’”206
Courts, like all institutions, have a culture; a way of
doing things that often separates insiders from outsiders.207
An extensive study of criminal courts, found, “all
[criminal] courts have the same work to do in guaranteeing
justice and liberty, but they organize themselves differently
to accomplish these goals depending on their culture.208
Building on the criminal courts study, Professor Breger
considers how the culture of family court is especially
conducive to groupthink mentality.
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The family court’s traditional informality and
collegiality, the presence of the same institutional players
interacting over long periods of time, and the crisis nature
of so many of its cases, can undermine the independence of
the various players in the court system.
There is
tremendous pressure to reach consensus, not to rock the
boat by challenging court norms, and, especially, to keep
the judge happy.209 Breger identifies that, “Groups have a
predilection to achieve uniformity, which is often
embedded in members’ subconscious. This desire for
uniformity is specifically manifested in the context of a
leader who exerts subtle pressure on the group to achieve
consensus. In the family court context, this leader is the
judge.”210
Breger’s conclusions are directly applicable to the
question of whether service providers should be part of the
court system or independent. As part of the court system,
these providers interact routinely with court staff and the
judge. They learn the “rules” of the court, the way things
are supposed to work, and may be reluctant to challenge the
status quo. Court-based service providers may be more
compliant with the court’s view of a family than they
would if they were establishing an independent
relationship. Their opinion about a youth or a parent may
be given greater weight with less supporting evidence by a
judge who “trusts” the provider she sees everyday and who
knows what matters to the judge. This in turn may
reinforce a bias against an independent service provider’s
opinion when another opinion is sought.211
Outsiders, even those trying to help the judge make
a good decision, may be more loyal to their independent
professional obligations toward the litigant than an insider.
They may also have a different experience with the client
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outside of court, where the client may be more comfortable
and less anxious. This leads to the second reason for
separating services from the court, a litigant’s reluctance to
engage in services closely aligned to the court.
Court reformers who want to situate services within
the court rarely consider the negative impact this may have
on the way family members accept help. Little attention is
paid to how family members may feel about the court
generally and, specifically here, securing services within
the court system. The proponents of the unified family
court believe the court serves as a place for families to get
help. I do not. People come to the family court either
because they have to, such as when the state charges a
youth with a crime or a parent with mistreating his children
or not paying child support, or because the court is the only
or last remaining place to address their unresolved custody,
visitation, domestic violence, or paternity issues. If these
families could resolve disputes themselves or receive
readily available and appropriately crafted assistance in
their communities, they would come to court only when
they needed a legal judgment. This is because courts, even
family courts, are essentially coercive institutions.
Writing about the family court unification
movement in 2002, Professor Wallace Mylniec and Anne
Geraghty bluntly summarized their concern:
A court is, at its core, an
instrument of social control.
What it does best is resolve
disputed factual issues at a
point when the litigants
cannot resolve them by
themselves. Courts gain
control
over
these
acrimonious situations only
through the threat or reality
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of coercion. Thus, courts are
generally seen as an option of
last resort, somewhere for
people to go to resolve
serious disputes without
resort to violence, and a place
where society can assert its
control over behavior that it
considers too egregious to go
unpunished. Most people
who appear before a court do
not wish to be there, and
would have chosen another
form of dispute resolution
had it been possible.212
Mylniec and Geraghty focus on the fact that most litigants
in family court are indigent and do not view the process as
consensual. These litigants understand, instead, that if they
do not comply with court-ordered services,, the court can
apply even more coercive sanctions, including fewer visits
with their children, loss of custody, or even jail time.
When Judge Baker waxed eloquent about the
medical metaphor of the juvenile court in 1910, he
nevertheless acknowledged that court-ordered services had
a punitive component that “affords in some cases an
indispensible stimulus or moral tonic….”213 Kahn
acknowledged that an improved court incorporating legal
safeguards would still be “a refined instrument of social
control and treatment…”214 My colleague, Professor Philip
Genty, has written about the need for lawyers to empathize
212
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with indigent clients’ fear of the legal system. This
empathy requires “an understanding of the client’s deep
fear and mistrust of the very legal system upon which the
client must rely for a solution to her or his legal
problem.”215 This mistrust does not arise in a vacuum.
Most parents and youth begin the court process in
communities deeply suspicious of government intervention.
When services are in the courthouse, most litigants may
find it very difficult to distinguish between the power of the
judge to order their compliance with services and the courtrelated service provider trying to engage the litigant with
the service. When the service provider is so closely aligned
to the judge, can a parent say to the provider that she thinks
the judge’s decision was wrong? Will she admit to using
drugs even though she has clean urine tests? That she’s
angry with her child for reporting her to child protective
services? That she thinks mediation is a waste of time?
The litigant may or may not want to receive help. Yet, if
she does not work with the provider, what is the likelihood
that the parent will get her children back, her support
reinstated, or her order of protection renewed? In short,
how else could the parent get or keep the judge on her side?
While no court-ordered service is voluntary, a
parent may still feel she has more privacy to discuss these
issues with a service provider outside the court system,
maybe even someone she chose, or who may work in her
community and may be willing to assist her long after the
court case is done. She may feel that she has some say
about what is reported back to the court by a treatment
provider who is not part of “the system.” Or, as Kahn
noted in 1953, “[C]hildren and parents can better accept
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social services from other agencies than from courts which
have called them in on petition.”216
These two concerns about court-based services,
along with others, raise serious issues about the experiences
of litigants that court reformers have mostly ignored. In the
end, these concerns are only a structural manifestation of
the more fundamental question facing unified courts: how
the therapeutic impulse defines the role of the judge. When
we look at that impulse what we find is that the medical
model of the early 20th century juvenile court is
transforming into the therapeutic jurisprudence model of
the early 21st with all its attendant dangers.
Therapeutic jurisprudence, according to its
adherents, “looks at law as a social force that, like it or not,
may
produce
therapeutic
or
anti-therapeutic
consequences.”217 The way a law is written or a court is
organized or a judge acts impacts the well being of the
persons involved.
The proponents of therapeutic
jurisprudence want to raise awareness of the legal system’s
potential for good or harm as a system and encourage
reform efforts that strive to minimize the negative
experiences individuals have when they find themselves
immersed in legal processes. They want to add therapeutic
considerations into the mix of other important
considerations about legal processes including “autonomy,
integrity of the fact-finding process, and community
safety.”218 In the family law context, “therapeutic justice
should strive to protect families and children from present
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and future harms, to reduce emotional turmoil, to promote
family harmony or preservation, and to provide
individualized and efficient, effective family justice.”219
Creating a unified family court will accomplish that goal.
The words of the leading proponents of the movement are
unequivocal on that point:
Rather, it is that we seem to
be onto something good for
children
and
families,
something that helps people
secure basic necessities and
leaves them with the tools
necessary to do so long into
their respective futures. This
something is a unified family
court,
the
underlying
principle of which is the
practice
of
therapeutic
justice. Therapeutic justice
concentrates on empowering
families
with
skills
development, assisting them
in resolving their own
disputes,
enhancing
coordination of court events
within the justice system,
providing direct services to
families when and where they
need them, and building a
system of dispute resolution
that is more cost efficient,
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user-friendly,
conscious.220

and

time

I have advocated that
UFCs embrace the notions of
therapeutic jurisprudence and
an
ecological,
holistic
approach to the family’s
problems. In that vein, I have
advocated that specially
trained and interested judges
address not only the legal
issues, such as divorce,
custody, child support, and
domestic violence, but also
that they consider the
family’s nonlegal needs, such
as substance abuse, mental
health issues, or domestic
abuse. A therapeutic and
ecological UFC model allows
for the resolution of legal,
personal, emotional, and
social disputes with the aim
of improving the well-being
and functioning of families
and children.221
A
additional
220

UFC has an
and vital goal
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beyond simple, efficient
umpiring: to make the
emotional life of families and
children better…The UFC is
based on the premise that
family
members
are
interconnected emotionally,
economically, and spiritually.
Any court order about one
family member is likely to
affect
all.
Whatever
behavioral,
mental-health
problems, or conflict that
brought one family member
to court is likely caused or
influenced by other family
members. The legal label
attached to the case is less
important to the delivery of
therapeutic justice than the
ability of the court to make
appropriate orders to address
the underlying dynamics
causing the family to come to
the court's attention in the
first place.222
These three descriptions have in common several
therapeutic components: the court is capable of intervening
in a family’s life not just to resolve the legal dispute that
brought the family to court but to improve the family’s life
by addressing the complex social, emotional or
psychological issues underlying the dispute; when
therapeutic courts intervene in the lives of families, the
222
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outcomes for the families will improve; and, most centrally,
the court is a good place to resolve family problems. These
basic tenets of the unified family court sound remarkably
like the therapeutic justifications for the original juvenile
court. Our brief historical review of judicial leadership in
the juvenile and family court systems, however, has never
found these therapeutic attempts to be successful on a
systemic level. Of course, a particular judge or a particular
program may work well for a while, such as those school
part judges in New York in the 1950’s or Judges Mack or
Edwards, because they are being run by exceptional,
committed judges and have received additional funding and
other resources. The few investigations into how unified
courts are working now, however, only show that there are
some administrative improvements in the way the court
works or some improved outcomes from consolidation of
court cases, not that a therapeutic approach is effective.223
This matters for fundamental reasons. Choosing to
create a court based on therapeutic principles means that
other principles, such as fairness or due process, may be
given less value., A judge being asked to help solve a
family’s problems may be less concerned about each
litigant having legal counsel or following strict evidentiary
standards or even reaching a decision based on the
evidence.224
In considering the role of therapeutic
jurisprudence in family court, Judge Gerald W. Hardcastle
recently wrote:
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Therapeutic justice implies
the court system will not only
resolve litigants’ disputes but
also
will
resolve
the
underlying
dysfunctions
existing in the litigants and
the families. It also implies
the judges know the “right”
answer. As a result, the
process is not about judicial
discretion. In complex social
relationships, the judge is
charged with finding the right
answers
and
accepts
responsibility for finding
those answers - keeping the
parties before the court until
answers are found. It is an
arrogant, ambitious task.225
Moreover, it is a task that puts at risk the trust that litigants
try to have in a fair process. Shifting from a neutral judge
to a “’healer’ or ‘participant in the process’ or a ‘sensitive,
emphatic counselor,’” can undermine a litigant’s
understanding of the way a court should operate and a
judge should act.226 A family court judge should be
empathetic and respectful, requiring everyone in the
courthouse to treat litigants considerately. Civility and
respect have, as their end goals, a fair and timely process
even if the outcome does not satisfy everyone. As Judge
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Hardcastle points out, the promise that a court can solve
problems is essentially a lie.227
Most litigants in family court have complex family
issues and are in desperate need of basic human services
that might make a difference: employment, decent
education and health care, child care and mental health
treatment, good housing and safe neighborhoods. Family
court judges cannot provide for those complex needs even
if they wish they could. As Kahn pointed out in 1953, “In
reviewing the Court’s total performance it must be recalled
that its task is exceedingly difficult and that many people
come to it because of the failings or lacks in other agencies
in the community…The basic fact which remains, however,
is that many children and parents known to the Court
require a complex range of services and facilities, but only
a minority are well served.”228 Myleniec and Gerraghty
repeated this “basic fact” fifty years later when they warned
that a unified family court cannot solve family problems:
Unified family courts by
themselves cannot stem the
increase in caseloads. They
can have no effect on the life
chances of the litigants prior
to the time a case is filed. Nor
will families face fewer
complex
problems
just
because court process and
jurisdiction have been unified
and the court becomes more
efficient. Poor education,
dwindling housing stock,
mental illness, drug use,
crime,
and
crumbling
227
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neighborhoods are all beyond
the reach of the court. Nor
can a court force the
executive and legislative
branches of government to
create more and better
services.229
Abandoning the therapeutic impulse to solve family
problems and improve family well-being does not mean
divesting the court of its adjudicative and dispositional
responsibilities. It means rethinking them. Juvenile and
family court judges have very difficult jobs. They see
thousands of litigants each year. These litigants are usually
the least favored among us, the poorest and the most
fragile. They are disproportionately people of color.
The court cannot solve the problems that bring them
there. What the court can do is make the best and fairest
decision possible with the resources available. Instead of
all the words used by judges who want to have some other
job, the litigants have a right to expect an impartial
decision-maker, who will listen to the evidence and make a
reasoned decision. Processes like hearings and settlement
conferences, slow our thinking down and require us to be
more deliberative. This is not an easy thing to do. We
know from the newest mind sciences that we’re not the
rational beings we thought we were. We know that judges,
like the rest of us, are subject to cognitive biases, but
cognitive biases can be challenged by trial procedures
subject to accountability standards, open courts and
appellate review. They are difficult to challenge in a court
where, as Judge Cindy Lederman says, “I’m not sitting
back and watching the parties and making a ruling. I’m
making comments. I’m encouraging. I’m making judgment
229
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calls. I’m getting very involved with families. I’m making
clinical therapeutic decisions to some extent, with the
advice of experts.”230
My plea is that Judge Lederman, and those like her,
be cautious, learn the lessons of history, mark the words of
Judge Hardcastle that therapeutic justice is an arrogant task,
and return to the humbler but nobler job of being a judge.
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